Introduction
One of the most compelling questions for organizers and scholars of labor movements in the in the twenty first century XXI century is to identify strategic sources of leverage for the millions of workers in the low-paid, insecure and highly exploitative service jobs of the Global North. Trade unions in the United Kingdom, despite recent efforts at implementing alternative community organizing methods (Wills 2001; Holgate and Wills 2007 ), can be hardly described as the most innovative at engaging these low-paid, precarious immigrant workers with new forms of mobilization. Some would argue this is due to the fact that British unions have remained stubbornly attached to a tradition of bureaucratized unionism based on the role of union officers (Kelly and Heery 2009) primarily concerned with protecting the 'vested' or 'sectional interest' (Virdee 2000) of their often 'male and pale', 'standard' members (Cockburn 1995; Greene 2015; Lucio and Perrett 2009). They do so mainly via institutional forms of representation and more recently favoring partnerships with employers away from workplace organizing (Martinez Lucio and Stuart 2004; Simms 2015) . Such 'conservatism' seems to have failed at reverting the deepening crisis of trade union representation. The number of unionized workers in the UK has been dropping steadily in the past twenty years: in 2011 in the private sector only 6% of workplaces bargained collectively over terms and conditions and only 14% of employees were union members (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013 ).
The gap of representation for the growing section of contracted out and precarious workers appears to be cause and effect of the decline of union power and incapacity of traditional unions to respond strategically to the impact of restructuring. Moody (2015) has highlighted how while outsourced workers in low-skilled service industries may be technically on 'permanent' contracts, they often enjoy lower conditions and poorer wages of those directly employed, remain insecure, with fewer possibilities of union voice (see also Grimshaw et al. 2014) . What has been defined in the literature as the spread of 'subcontracted capitalism' across the private and public sector has made it increasingly hard to organize workers who cannot bargaining directly with their 'main employer'
(Wills 2009).
A marked growth of 'zero-hour contracts' during the recession and the continuing tendency of workplaces to outsource at least some of their services to save costs (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013: 11) have further weakened the limited bargaining power of migrants and ethnic minorities in traditionally non-unionised sectors (Holgate et al., 2012) . And yet, labour and community organizing initiatives, with different degrees of support from official unions, have achieved some successes at contrasting the degrading conditions of low-paid workers across hospitals, universities, banks and hotels in the UK and beyond (Alberti 2016; Adler et al. 2013; Jordhus-Lier and Underthun 2014) . In the face of the hollowing out of traditional union bargaining broad labor-community alliances such as the Living Wage Campaigns (LWCs) emerged as more effective strategies to put pressure on the main employer through 'blaming and shaming' strategies targeting the corporate employer in 'high profile' campaigns (Anderson et al. 2010; Holgate and Wills 2007; Tattersal and Reynolds 2007; Wills 2008) .
A limit of this literature on migrant workers organizing and 'community unionism' is that it tends to study trade union and wider community campaigns from the perspective of the wider alliances built by the organizational actors involved (Wills 2008) ; the politics of UK unions vis-a-vis migrants as vulnerable workers (Fitzgerald and Hardy 2010) ; and only seldom from the perspective of workers and organizers in a specific sector or workplace (Holgate 2005; Pearson et al. 2013) . We rather start from the workers and lay organizers' own accounts of their experiences of unionisation, mobilization and involvement in labour campaigns.. Also, rather than treating migrant workers organizing as a segregated area within Industrial Relations, often left to the 'specialists' similarly to what happened to the study of women and black members in trade unions (Holgate et al. 2006, Kirton and Greene 2002) , the organization of migrant precarious labor is addressed engaging directly with some of the long standing debates in the IR literature, including the challenges for trade unions to organize workers in jobs contracted out to private companies (Grimshaw et al. 2014; Weinkopf et al. 2013; Wills 2009 ); the impact of the regulatory limitations of union recognition (Gall 2004; Ewing 2011; McKay and Moore 2004) ; and the traditional distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' trade union voice (Dundon and Gollan 2007; Kaufman 2015, Marchington and Suter 2013; Terry 1977; Wilkinson et al. 2010) . The recent debate on the resurgence of autonomist worker organizations (Ness 2014 ) is also considered in our attempt to de-construct the assumptions of employment research associating 'informal voice' with weak and individualized forms of employee involvement and 'formal voice' with the institutional channels of collective representation (Kaufman 2015: 34) i .
Ironically, from the heart of the British IR tradition we may find ways to introduce migrant worker's mobilization into the wider debate on the crisis of trade unions in search of new sources of leverage. Many years ago, at a peculiar historical time when a new compromise between the British Government and the trade unions attempted to insert formal mechanisms of negotiation to replace 'the amalgam' of informal understandings between workers and foremen on the shopfloor, Terry (1977) envisaged the 'inevitable growth of informality' in UK employment relations. Being aware of the different historical context and the changes brought about by new wave of 'formalization' of union voice (Gall 2004 ), Terry's reflections seem particularly relevant today as we witness conflicting patterns between a 're-formalization' of union activity in response to the increasing hostility of employers to workplace organizing (Gall 2007) , and what we identify as an example of the revival of informal bargaining in sectors with low or constrained union presence.
Considering these different sets of literature and drawing from a qualitative study of a campaign led by outsourced migrant workers at the University of London, the following analysis explores the extent to which formal/informal mechanisms of bargaining and mobilization work effectively for migrant precarious workers in fragmented workplaces. The striking result of the study is that despite significant social, legal and organizational barriers and the joint pressure by multiple employer and the recognized union, the outsourced migrant workers, organized in a small rank-and-file 'social movement union' (Schenk 2003) achieved remarkable victories in terms of equalizing their sick pay, holiday and pension rights with those directly employed. Our main contention is that the emergence of alternative forms of struggles in service jobs deemed 'unorganizable' hints to the growing relevance of 'informal bargaining' and social movement strategies outside recognised trade unions. Yet, at the same time unofficial unions seek formal mechanisms of voice and legitimization to increase the power of their relatively disenfranchised constituencies, including the use of legal action to defend workers' rights and develop alternative forms of collective voice.
Subcontracted capitalism in the United Kingdom and the constraints to union voice
With 'subcontracted capitalism' (Wills, 2009) spreading across the private and public sectors in UK, trade unions are facing increasing difficulties to organize and bargain for workers in outsourced low-paid services (Grimshaw et al. 2014; Weinkopf et al. 2013; Wills et al. 2009 ). The combination of the short-term nature of contracts and increased competition means that contractors tend to cut back on employees' pay and standards of work. Grimshaw et al. (2014) explored the role of trade unions in the context of outsourced cleaning in the UK, highlighting the impact of the 'fragmentation of organizational boundaries' between the client organization and the contractor on the voice and trade union rights of contract workers (see also Marchington and Rubery 2005) . Fragmentation of the employment relationship occurs in those settings where workers have multiple employers accountable for their everyday terms and conditions, a factor that generates confusion over to whom to direct their grievances. For instance, the supervisor or company manager may retain control over the actual performance of assignments in situ, while the contractor remains responsible for questions of payroll, replacement and sickness. Furthermore, for an externalised workforce it is not possible to reach collective agreements across different occupations, skills sets and wages (Grimshaw et al. 2014 ). In such 'multi-employer settings' traditional forms of trade unionism are complicated by the outsourced workers' 'indirect dependency' on the client organization, who will ultimately decide over HR and working conditions. In this regard Wills (2008) argues that even when workers organize at the level of the single supplier to improve pay and conditions, the result may be detrimental for their jobs in terms of pricing the contractor out of the market. In the bargaining process, unions have to consider the overlapping and at times conflicting interests among the different parties to the outsourcing contract (Grimshaw et al. 2014 ). The complex inter-organizational relations characterising outsourced job indeed contain points of fragility that can be more easily tackled by new alliances of workers and community groups interested in advancing the conditions of workers at the bottom of the chain. Public campaigns demanding the Living Wage may be more powerful than traditional union activity in those sectors by bringing together corporations, political authorities and media institutions at the local level and building a 'moral argument' in support of low-paid migrant workers while exposing those responsible to public scrutiny (Anderson et al., 2010: 387) .
However, even from within the literature on community unionism it is acknowledged that, while able to put pressure on their 'real employer' along the contracting chain, LWCs provide only limited power to workers to 'recalibrate' the day-to-day employment relations vis-a-vis their contractor (Wills, 2009) . The admission that 'community unionism' may not be sufficient for outsourced workers to confront issues arising from within the everyday relations at work points to the continuing relevance of rank-and-file and workplace-based organizing. Critics have also highlighted the limits of the top-down approaches of 'community' or corporate campaigns, including the risks of leaving the rank-and-file out of strategic decision-making, reproducing patronizing approaches towards those considered 'too vulnerable to organize' (Kirkpatrick 2014; Ness 2014) or 'contracting out' the struggle to the community rather than engaging workers on the ground (Alberti 2016).
In the face of increasing hostility by employers who avoid trade unions recognition, new forms of autonomous worker organizations rooted in worker self-activity similar to the syndicalist organizations of the early twentieth century are rather '…expanding beyond, into the complex, transforming nexus of community and workplace' (Ness 2014: 10) . For Ness there are reasons to remain skeptical of traditional forms of collective bargaining as well as 'corporatist models' of organizing, including new variations of social movement and community unionism involving the use of professional, university-educated organizers since they fail to promote worker democratic control of their organization.
Others in the US have more optimistically highlighted the possibility to reconcile the mobilization of workers through community-wide and social movement campaigns with 'rank-and-file intensive organizing' (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Turner and Cornfield, 2007) .
The present article, focusing on the innovative strategies of outsourced migrant workers organized in an autonomous rank-and-file union, falls exactly at the crossroad of these approaches. It shows how, while workers rely on alternative self-directed action and social movement imaginative strategies, they use strategically the existing repertoire of union bargaining to confront their employers while trying to circumvent the legal strictures of UK employment relations. While British unions have historically operated within a tradition of 'collective laissez-faire', whereby both employers and workers are assumed to voluntarily engage in collaborative relations, in 1999 the then Labour party in government introduced a mechanism of trade union Statutory Recognition that partly changed these dynamics. Statutory recognition compels employers to recognize a trade union within a specified bargaining unit under defined circumstances. First, the union needs to demonstrate to have at least 10% of the membership as a condition to apply to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC). This is an independent body intervening in recognition and de-recognition processes where the parties cannot agree voluntarily (Acas 2014a). Second, the CAC will only grant recognition if the trade union shows 'either through a ballot or through levels of membership that it has the support of a majority of workers in the bargaining unit' (Acas 2014: 2) ii Critical to the current case, in order for the union to make an application to the CAC , there must be no other voluntary recognized unions in the workplace (Acas 2014a; see also Gall 2007:78) .
The introduction of statutory mechanisms has been considered a step away from the tradition of 'collective voluntarism' typical of the British system under which collective agreements are not legally binding and it is rather the actual bargaining power of the social parts on the ground that determines the outcomes of the negotiation. The official positions of UK trade unions at the time of the changes in favour of statutory recognition might be understood as a preference for a 'formalization of IR' in the face of their overall declining power and growing hostility from employers (Gall 2007: 79) .
In the last decade however the use of statutory procedures by UK trade unions has been declining: from 89 per year in the first five years the number of application reached 54 in the five years to 2010-11 (Moore et al. 2013 ). These trends can be attributed to the increasing anti-union climate in the UK, the effects of employer tactics of 'union suppression' including open victimization of members carrying out recruitment initiatives (Gall 2004 (Gall , 2007 and risks of 'union substitution' with employers appointing their own 'in-house' unions and negotiating agreements with non-union representative bodies (Ewing 2011 ). These problems have not been considered in contexts such as that of the 3 Cosas campaign, where there are more than one 'independent union' competing for union recognition.
Despite the hurdles in obtaining trade union recognition due to the legal procedure in force in the UK (e.g. the need to demonstrate to have more than 50% membership support and the impossibility to make a referral to the CAC for a ballot if there is already a recognised union in the same bargaining unit), and the specific barriers to unionizing jobs that are contracted out, outsourced workers may still benefit from formal collective
representation. An earlier report on the impact of recognition agreements in the UK highlighted how the very fact that workers felt they had a voice in their workplace increased their sense of security and 'was often more important to them than the material benefits arising from collective bargaining' (McKay and Moore 2004: 376) . Overall the shift to a relatively higher degree of formalisation in a context of increasingly 'informal'
and precarious employment relations can be understood as an expression of the crisis of British trade unions put under pressure by 'unilaterally minded employers' (Gall 2004: 79) . In this contest it is striking that, exactly in the face of increasing hostility and legal constraints, the 'unorganizable' (Milkman 2006) are getting organized through a range of innovative forms of bargaining and mobilization, within and beyond the boundaries of existing rules.
Methods
The present research on the '3 Cosas Campaign' is based on a range of qualitative The choice of social media research witnesses the increasing relevance of digital forms of resistance to amplify the voices of groups of workers that would otherwise remain hidden or perceived as marginal. While unions have been slow at taking up social technologies, and particularly so when compared to the creative and innovative tactics and street protests developed by social movements in the past decades, there is growing awareness in the literature on workforce diversity of how social media can be considered new critical channels of employee voice (Greene 2015) : beside creating 'shared identification and mutuality between geographically and socially separated individuals' (Saundry et al. 2007:180) , on line technologies also provide 'safer spaces' for workers who fear exposure, prefer to stay invisible or cannot confront their employers directly.
Still some scepticism persists about the extent to which mediated participation via new technologies produces empowering tools for labour and other social movements or rather remain relatively individualistic channels of political expression (Fenton and Barassi 2011) .
Taking account of these and of wider limitations of the culturally mediated nature of online media research (Kozinet et al. 2013) , the research combined the media analysis and fieldnotes with qualitative face-to face interviews on workers' different experiences of the campaign. Interviewees were selected so that they included both male and female individuals with different functions and positions within the two unions. We purposely decided to focus on the perspectives of the rank-and-file, lay representatives and activists to explore workers' and organizers' own experiences of bargaining and mobilization rather than the point of view of the union leadership. The qualitative interviews and social media contents were analysed in conjunction with secondary sources such as the articles published on the campaign by journalists from the Guardian and the Independent. These provided critical insights into the dynamics of the negotiation between workers and management and the wider 'economy' of the University of London as an example of a multi-employer setting characterized by tense and politically-loaded relationships.
Ethical challenges emerged from conducting a qualitative case study of a campaign that achieved high publicity while remaining contentious. To avoid individuals to be identified the specific roles of the leaders and members within the union branch are not revealed (unless their testimonies had been already published on line). Written correspondences between the two unions, the UoL and the contractor(s) have been treated with confidentiality avoiding reproduction of personal names and functions. It was of primary importance to protect the real identities of the precarious, often non-English speaking migrant workers, to avoid further victimisation of those mainly exposed as a result of their union involvement. However it is worth highlighting that the 'strategy of visibility'
at the centre of the 3 Cosas campaign, including the willingness of the women workers to become visible to their employers even as they risked dismissal, put into question common assumptions about the 'vulnerability' of such participants. It has yet to be recognized by any employer but as 'certified union' (Carr 2014, 46) it can represent workers at grievances, disciplinary and at employment tribunals over unfair dismissal, discrimination and personal injury claims.
It is likely that factors related to cultural, linguistic and political differences explain the internal frictions that led to the split between the outsourced workers (mainly from Latin America) and the leadership of Senate House Branch. These aspects are only partially explored here, as we rather focus on the specific issues experienced by the outsourced workers because of their migrant and employment status, that led to their involvement in the campaign.
A contractually differentiated workforce
Service workers' terms and conditions at Bloomsbury campus are shaped by the complex inter-organizational relationships between their contractor and 'main employer'. . As highlighted by one interviewee, given that most of the workers do not know how long they will be sick for when they fall ill, and given that it is extremely difficult to survive on £85.85 per week in London (granted on the 4 th consecutive day of absence), the reality is that many of the workers come in to work when sick or injured as they cannot afford doing otherwise (Interview with Juan, porter, IWGB UoL branch, September 2013). This issue is worsened by the nature of cleaning and maintenance work. Health issues are ordinary for workers doing physically demanding jobs and exposed to a series of chemicals such as cleaners. In response to this situation one demand of the campaign has been to receive the same treatment as in-house workers and occupational sick pay increasing with seniority.
A second key area of discontent for outsourced workers has been in relation to holiday pay. As emphasised by the organiser interviewed:
It is not just about the number of days, but the possibility to take them for certain periods of time, especially for migrant workers who wish to visit their family overseas (Interview with IWGB organizer, September 2012).
As a solution to these problems, linked to both the migrant and contractual status of the outsourced workers, the campaigners demanded: flexibility in the period for taking holidays; entitlement to 30 paid holidays, bank holidays, school closure days for all outsourced workers on similar terms with the UoL employees entitled to 44 paid holidays per year (see 3 Cosas Campaign Website 2014).
Thirdly, outsourced workers were unsatisfied with the existing pension scheme. As the campaign started there was a scheme that outsourced workers were allowed to join but the workers deemed it 'not worth it' (Interview with Juan, porter, IWGB UoL branch September 2013). A major gap with those directly employed by UoL was that, not only the latter received a higher percentage of contributions from their employer (6%) but also enjoyed further personal and family benefits (3 Cosas Campaign Website 2014).
There were other groups of workers on campus who struggled even to gain entitlement to statutory rights. This groups is constituted by agency workers and workers on 'zerohour contracts' whose status as 'workers' rather than 'employees' implies only statutory minimum entitlements and exclusion from benefits such as protection from unfair dismissal, redundancy protection, a minimum notice period and rights to maternity and paternity leave (TUC 2007) . They are now entitled to equal treatment with directly This mobilization approach typical of social movement campaigns did not exclude however the use of more traditional 'rank and file' workplace-based unionism tactics, including workplace daily negotiation, strikes, pickets and worker-led direct action. In tune with the syndicalist style of the Wobblies (IWGB represented a break-away union from the London-based IWW Cleaners Branch v ), direct actions included sit-ins, occupation of University sites and contractor's offices by both workers and supporters.
Yet, in the latest phase of the campaign, the grass root union embraced the use of more traditional legal action strategies such as employment tribunal claims against the contractor.
In November 2013 the union IWGB received a massive mandate from the ballot and organized three successful strikes involving the outsourced cleaners, porters and maintenance workers at Senate House and in the Halls for residence. Thanks to the students' mobilization for the collection of a strike fund using of a 'promotional' You Tube video, within a short time the campaign managed to raise about £4,000. The On their side the IWGB claimed to be the largest union among the Cofely workers and considered invalid any agreements made on behalf of workers by Unison. In the early months of 2014 IWGB decided to launch a public 'letter campaign', whereby outsourced workers would write individual letters asking the contractor to recognize IWGB as their representative union. One cleaner listed the fundamental reasons for feeling better supported by the unrecognized union:
The reason for believing in the IWGB union is that it is made up of workers like us and we feel confident, understood and listened to since there are various cases which have been resolved. I was one of those who benefited greatly and it is because of all of that that we want the union to please be recognized. Union recognition is very important for us (Letter by Marta Luna Marroquin, IWGB member, worker of Hughes Parry hall, February 2014).
In a later interview another woman cleaner from Bolivia among, a key activist of the IWGB branch, highlighted how the demand for union recognition had always been at the core of the 3 Cosas campaign:
Yes the demand for recognition for us is very important, it was part of our demands already during the strike at the end of November 2013, as well as in the strike of last January. We have always gone for official union recognition. But As discussed in the literature the current regulatory framework for voluntary and statutory union recognition in the UK prevents secondary unions to apply for recognition. The CAC, to whom the application for recognition needs to be submitted in case of lack of voluntary agreement among the parties, 'will not accept applications from competing trade unions' (Acas 2014a). Only if the trade unions applying ensure that they will cooperate with each other in the process of collective bargaining with the employers then a single joint application is acceptable. This narrow window for cross-union cooperation foresaw by the legislation was evidently shut in the case of Bloomsbury campus considering the ongoing conflict between Unison and IWGB.
According to President of the IWGB branch the real reasons for Cofely to reject IWGB's claim for recognition lied in the contractor's discomfort with the adversarial type of union tactics endorsed by the rank-and-file union as well as their use of 'formal procedures such as grievances, employment tribunals, and strikes, and that we cite employment law in our emails" (IWGB Response to Cofely letter to IWGB members on recognition, 27 March 2014).
It is worth noticing that the leaders of the movement associated their 'adversarial industrial practices' to formal procedures rather than to the alternative and confusing tactics 'at the edge of legality' target of the Carr Review (2014) .
The ambivalent function of recognition
The Unison rep who remained supportive of the campaign even after the split highlighted the material benefits of recognition for the outsourced workers. Loosing recognition has been one of the most serious consequences of the workers' decision to leave Unison, although recognition may be used by management to marginalize the unrecognized union:
IWGB managed at times to obtain from people to respect their picket lines…But it is easier if you are in the same organisation… it (joining IWGB) put the workers in a weaker position because (…) BBW could voluntarily recognise them but it would be quite odd especially as this is an adversarial union, and if they have When I spoke with my fellow workers I told them: we cannot allow that they abuse us because we are free people and, even more, we are workers. As workers this does not mean that the company or individual peoples can trample our rights.
The fact of being cleaners does not mean that we are less than nothing. We are human beings (…) I was telling to my fellow women workers 'we are living in
England we cannot allow that anyone step on us, and we have to overcome this…everyday animando y animando ('encouraging and encouraging')... Rather than an 'escalator' (Wilkinson et al. 2010) , the case of the 3 Cosas campaign highlights a spectrum or dynamic interplay of formality and informality of union voice, whereby workers and their leaders seem to 'move up and down the scale' mixing a range of strategies according to the specific context. This finding is in contrast with the mainstream IR literature that still tends to compartmentalize different forms of voice according to their structure and to the nature of the actors initiating them (individual vs.
collective, formal/informal, union vs. employer) (Dundon and Gollan 2007; Kaufman 2015; Wilkinson et al. 2010) . It also questions the tendency in the literature on rank-andfile unionism to associate institutionalized forms of union voice such as recognition campaigns and the use of legal action only to mainstream bargaining unions (Ness 2014) .
While the campaign demonstrates the strategic advantage of informal, unpredictable industrial action, our argument is that relatively formalized union voice becomes of particular importance for precarious migrant workers, especially where recognition has potential to strengthen their bargaining power vis-a-vis their direct and indirect employers. The strategic inter-play between formality and informality needs to be understood in relation to the specific nature of the employment relations in the context of contracting out of services and under multiple-employer arrangements (Grimshaw et al 2014; Wills 2009 ).
In the course of the campaign the demand for recognition has also played a critical role in terms of a battle for 'symbolic legitimacy' (cf. Certainly the distinction between recognized and non-recognized unions works as a mechanism to manage employment relations among contractually layered workforces, further marginalizing unrecognized unions. And yet, this study also highlighted the role that a non-recognized union can play in the outsourced workplace, independently of recognition. The existing critical literature has for some time highlighted the limitations and gaps inherent to current regulation of statutory recognition in the UK (Gall 2004; and that employers 'create' and recognize 'in-house unions to pre-empt and avoid independent unions' (Ewing 2011) . Moving further, we showed how well established 'independent unions' might be rather used by employers to exclude new representatives and voices in the fragmented workplace as current processes of partnership and cooptation of managers into representative functions compromise the actual independence of 'independent' unions.
With regard the use of employment tribunals by IWGB this is nothing extraordinary when compared with the daily activities of unions representing workers in the low-paid, barely unionised service jobs, struggling with individual casework, grievances and 'countless employment tribunal claims' (Turnbull, 2005: 15) . It is hard to imagine how, without the wider mobilization and support by the students and other sympathizers at Bloomsbury campus, these workers would have made any advancement in their claim for equality. 
